crops; labor supply is calculated by multiplying the "average annual labor days available per worker" times the size of the agricultural labor force. As Taylor and Banister (1989) point out, these calculations are highly sensitive to the number of labor days assumed to be available, which has sometimes been set at a full 360-day year.
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rural labor force is not needed for agricultural production. During the period from the late 1950s until the late 1970s, agricultural workers were prevented from moving and paid according to the number of days present in the fields. This incentive structure caused the number of days worked per rural laborer to rise from 119 in the early 1950s to 189 in 1959, and then to between 215 and 284 by 1975 (Taylor, 1988) . Under the current household responsibility system, households
are paid for what they produce, so that each household has an incentive to economize on agricultural labor in order for its members to earn income from other activities.
However, the creation of surplus labor is only a precondition for migration:
as Arizpe (1983:164) has noted for Mexico, "it would be inappropriate to turn the truism that the rural exodus is generally the result of the development of capitalism into an abstract principle to explain migration." Just as there are alternatives to migrating to the United States for rural Mexicans, there are alternatives to moving to the large cities of China. In order to understand why so many Chinese peasants have chosen to do just this, it is necessary to understand just how effective, until recendy, were the restrictions against such a move.
Household
Registration System
Every person in China is registered in a household registration book (hukou bu), which defines the family as either an agricultural household (nongye hukou) or urban resident household (chengshijumin hukou), with the latter entided to subsidized housing, social insurance, medical care and, until recendy, employ? ment. The division between the two categories is so inflexible that it has been characterized as a "structural cleavage" (Blecher, 1985) , with the hukou system "the institutional guardian of the deep urban-rural divide that has characterized China since the mid-1950s" (Cheng and Selden, 1994:667). Even adminis? trative changes in the rural or urban status of a locality don't affect hukou status; so as China has urbanized there has emerged a large population of agricultural residents in the cities, confusing the definitions of rural versus urban and agricultural versus nonagricultural (Goldstein, 1990; Chan, 1994b ). Grain -increasing production and restricting access -is the key to under? standing both the reason for implementation of the hukou system and its current lack of effectiveness in stemming the flow of migrants to the cities. If China were to rapidly industrialize, it had to channel its agricultural surplus to industry in order to keep wages low and investment high. Food output had to increase without absorbing resources that might be used for industrializa? tion, which meant fully utilizing the only resource freely available in the countryside -rural labor. Thus, Yingsheng Li (1994:162) contends that "the main motive for establishing controls on population migration was to ensure direct control of the rural population" in order to increase agricultural produc?
tion. For this increased production to facilitate industrialization, competing demands for surplus grain, especially from the urban service sector, needed to job and state-subsidized grain were only available to workers in the urban areas. There were no outlets for grain in the cities other than state stores that required grain coupons, no rental housing, and no jobs for migrants; these and urban social welfare were the state-provided commodities that supported the hukou system (Mallee, 1995 (Lin, 1992) . In addition, the government no longer guaranteed the farmer it would buy a fixed amount at above-quota prices, increasing uncertainty and reducing expected profits (Sicular, 1993) . Lower agricultural prices are half of the "price scissors" that reduced rural incomes -the other was rising agricultural costs. Urea, the principal fertilizer, sold for 450 yuan per ton until 1984; its official price rose to 700 yuan by 1988, and it could even then often be obtained only on the black market at over 1,000 yuan per ton (Aubert, 1990) . By 1995 its price, adjusted for inflation, had risen to almost 1400 yuan. The state attempted to solve this problem and that of declining grain procurement by linking the delivery of subsidized fertilizer and diesel fuel with sales of grain to the state, but these subsidized inputs were siphoned off into the black market by local officials. Gross revenue rose from 1,500 to 2,000 yuan per hectare in these crops, but net revenue fell (Aubert, 1990 (Perkins, 1992) . Even if technologically pos? sible, it would require raising the price paid farmers to induce them to devote more resources to grain, so that either subsidies would rise far above their 1989 level of 13.5 percent of government revenues, or urban dwellers would pay more for food (Johnson, 1994) . Johnson (1992:33) believes that China's relatively small urban population (Roberts, 1982) . The current wave of Chinese labor migration from the rural areas to the large cities is also predominantly circular. Over half of the rural labor migrants in Shanghai's 1993 floating population had been in the city for less than six months, and another quarter had lived there between six months and one year (Roberts and Wei, 1996) . A 1992 survey of Beijing's floating population (of which peasant workers are only one part) showed 24 percent had been in the city less than three months, 21 percent three to six months, 31 percent six months to one year, 16 percent from one to three years, and 7 percent over three years (JPRS, 1993a) . While this same survey concluded that a significant group "is showing signs of striking roots," these roots may not go too deep; a 1993 survey in "Zhejiang village," the largest migrant community in Beijing, found that 90 percent of the migrants planned on returning home after several years in the city {China Daily, 1993b).
Until prevented from doing so by the hukou system and the policy of "putting grain first" that predominated during the prereform years, Chinese peasants had always sought to diversify their sources of income. In the 1930s, many peasant households near Suzhou derived half their income from nonagricultural activities, especially weaving (Fei, 1986) . In Shandong province in the 1940s, "when a second son is born, the parents do not worry that their small piece of land will be divided into two parts. Instead, they begin to hope that when their sons are grown up, one will be a hired laborer, another a mason, and that they will earn not only their own living but add fifty dollars or so to Migration Review the family every year" (Yang, 1947) . Even in late imperial China, "a surer way to wealth was to diversify out of agriculture into commerce, artisanship, and money lending. Diversification often entailed spatial dispersal of family for? tunes by opening up new commercial or wage labor opportunities.
The more sons, the more activities a family could diversify into, the greater its ability to send workers to places of economic opportunity, and thus the greater its success in 'diversification/dispersal strategies'" (Greenhalgh, 1988:648 hold's labor supply considers the comparative advantage of each household member: "those who can work in factories do; the others, often women and the older members of the family, work the entire family's fields" (Oi, 1989:195) . This has led to the phenomenon called the "three changes" (sanhud) in farm labor -the change to the labor of women (nuhua), the elderly (laohua), and the weak and feeble (ruanhud) (Christiansen, 1992) . It has also increased the pressures on men to marry young in order to recruit a daughter-in-law into the household labor force, one factor in the decline in the average age of marriage in rural areas by 1.8 years since 1982 (Croll, 1994) .
Links to the Land
An essential component of the strategy of circular migration is keeping a foot on the farm. In Mexico, these links to the land were strengthened by the ejidal system, under which farmers would lose their rights to communally owned but individually farmed plots of land if it was left uncultivated for several years. The ideological legacy of the Revolution that created the ejidos undoubtedly strengthened these ties -one man said, "We don't want to lose our land because this is what we old folks fought for, at least to have a roof over our heads and a few beans to eat_Today the young people aren't as interested in defending the land because they go outside, earn more and then bring back money for fiestas or to improve their houses, but not to invest in business" (Grindle, 1988 (Siu, 1993) . The second is that land allocations have been readjusted with some frequency in the past, and despite the more secure tenure promised by legislation, peasants are afraid they will forfeit their land in the next reallocation of land rights (Judd, 1992) . In Mexico, each family has kept the same ejidalplot since it was originally allocated, and The state, recognizing that migrants "float not against the state, but with it," has been tolerant and circumspect in its public criticism (Solinger, 1993:91) .
It can afford to be so because it reserves the power to expel migrants when they cease to be functional. It has exercised this immense power over urban residence on two notable occasions during the Maoist period: following the Great Leap Forward and after the most chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution, when 18 million young people were sent to the countryside despite the fact that they held urban registrations (Wu, 1994) . More recently, millions of "redundant peasant workers" were released during the 1988-89 economic retrenchment, and there was increased enforcement of registration status in the cities (Christiansen, 1992) . Urban resentment has instead focused on the societal impacts of migrants.
They worry urban planners because of the increased demands they place on gas, water, and electricity. They congest transportation on trains, buses, and subways. But the complaint most commonly lodged against migrants is that they are responsible for the rise in crime: migrants were held responsible for There already seems to be increased emphasis on identity and enforcement.
The Ministry of Public Security issued a regulation requiring all transient workers to obtain a temporary residence permit in order to work or conduct 3This same principle operated in late nineteenth century Mexico: 'Whenever a recession or crisis occurred separately, the agricultural workers could always resort to another occupation. If the harvest was bad they could go to the mines, if there was not work to be found in mining they could go to the United States, and if the Americans offered no work they could go to a hacienda and try sharecropping. But if all three employment opportunities were affected by the same crisis, their situation became desperate. This was precisely the case on the eve of the Mexican Revolution" (Katz, 1974:35) . tude of migration will grow as network development increases contacts and information and reduces costs and risks. These factors are still effective restraints on Chinese migration -a recent survey of 4,000 households in eight provinces showed more than one-third wanted to increase their migration, but had not done so because of lack of contacts (36%) and information (25%). Of those who didn't want to migrate anymore, 17 percent said it was too insecure and 9 percent listed the costs and hardships of travel. Most had not even considered migration as an option, suggesting a lack of information was the single biggest constraint (Knight and Song, 1996) . Networks will exponen? tially increase the flow of information reaching potential migrants. The second implication of maturing networks is that the regional specificity of migrant flows between particular origins and destinations will likely inten?
sify. Already, most migrants come from several central provinces, and from within these provinces "the higher the socioeconomic development level (of a community) . . . the higher the probability of migration" (J. Zhu, 1995:15). As networks mature, more and more nonmigrants from these communities will participate, as their "relative deprivation" compared to migrants combines with their access to facilitating networks (Stark and Taylor, 1989) . Those areas that are the most economically marginal and culturally isolated will be pre? cluded from urban migration unless specific channels are opened to ease entry of their residents into urban job markets. Thus, without state intervention, the gap between rich and poor rural areas will widen rather than decrease. The third implication of maturing networks is that the process of settlement will intensify. Wives will join their husbands, and young women will migrate to escape the constraints of village life. These migrants will cluster in specific neighborhoods in and around the cities, forming bi-local communities such as "Zhejiang Village." And, like there, if the state doesn't officially recognize their existence with the provision of services comparable to those received by urban residents, migrants will set up their own schools and clinics, making them increasingly independent of state control. As this continues, the analogy that I have made between Chinese migration and Mexican undocumented migration will eventually give way to the traditional model of permanent rural-to-urban migration, with the networks and migrant communities formed during the current period of circular migration providing the stepping-stones in the transition from one process to the other.
